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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ENTRAPMENT: INSTIGATION NOT INVESTIGATION
Contradictory considerations beset law enforcement officers
in uncovering crime. The police have the duty of apprehending
lawbreakers, and are subject to substantial pressure for convic-
tions to demonstrate their vigilance.1 They must take account,
however, of basic human rights and liberties and of the fact that
human nature is frail and requires no encouragement in wrong-
doing.2 Also involved are the chief aims of the criminal law -
preventing socially harmful conduct and establishing basic stand-
ards of citizenship.A The courts in reconciling these interests
have sought to curtail overzealous law enforcement by creating
the defense of entrapment for persons who, without prior crim-
inal intent, are induced to commit a crime by the police or some-
one acting under their direction.4 The defense is meant to pro-
tect innocent persons from being drawn, through use of govern-
mental power, into lapses they might otherwise resist, but not to
prevent the apprehension of persons already embarked on a
course of criminal conduct. 5 The idea for this defense is that
law officers should not create criminals merely to punish them ;6
rather, that their first duty is to prevent crime.7 Law enforce-
ment agencies should not be the ruin of citizens, but rather their
safeguard and protection.8 Thus, the defense of entrapment ab-
solves a defendant of criminal liability when he has been per-
suaded to commit a crime, which he would otherwise not have
committed, by law officers or those acting under their direction.
The defense was suggested as early as 18789 and mentioned
.1. Note, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 88 (1959).
2. Love v. People, 160 Ill. 501, 508, 43 N.E. 710, 713 (1896) : "Strong men
are sometimes unprepared to cope with temptation and resist encouragement to
evil when financially embarrassed and impoverished."; Saunders v. People, 38
Mich. 218 (1878); See Williams, Entrapment-A Legal Limitation on Police
Techniques, 48 J. CmiR. L., C.&P.S. 343 (1957).
3. See Model Penal Code § 2.10 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 159).
4. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) ; State v. Turner, 241
La. 94, 127 So. 2d 512 (1961) ; Comment, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 223 (1963) ; and
note 45 infra.
5. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933).
6. State v. Turner, 241 La. 94, 99, 127 So. 2d 512, 514 (1961).
7. Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).
8. United States v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918).
9. See United States v. Whittier, 28 Fed. Cas. 591 (E.D. Mo. 1878) (decoy
letters held to be proper. In quoting from Comment, 10 VAND. L. REV. 608
(1957)., Commissioners v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y. 1964), the court said
that the earliest plea of entrapment was overruled by the Great Lawgiver after
hearing the plea of Eve in Paradise: "The serpent beguiled me and I did eat."




by the United States Supreme Court in 1895.10 The first appli-
cation in a federal court was Woo Wai v. United States in 1915, 1
but the Supreme Court did not apply the defense until 1932 in
Sorrells v. United States.'2 Today, the doctrine is generally rec-
ognized,1 3 and the entrapped person will not be held criminally
responsible,' 4 but the courts have never fully agreed on the basis
for this defense despite wide use of the'doctrine.
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DOCTRINE
Conflicts in the decisions and inconsistencies in reasoning
have created uncertainty about entrapment. Estoppel," public
policy,'0 want of voluntary criminality," statutory interpreta-
tion, ' and due process1 9 have been considered, at various times,
as the basis of the doctrine. Deciding the correct basis is im-
portant to clarity of analysis20 'and to a determination whether
the defense is of a permanent character.2 ' If the doctrine is a
judicial creation or is founded on legislative policy, it can be
abrogated much more easily than if it is a constitutional re-
quirement.
In Sorrells v. United States the Supreme Court rejected the
estoppel basis2 2 but was divided on whether the proper basis was
10. See Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895).
11. 223 Fed. 412 (6th Cir. 1916).
12. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
13. All but two jurisdictions agree that the defense is available to one who
comnits a crime where the intent originated with a state official. See Annot.,
33 A.L.R.2d 884 (1952). The defense is not recognized in Tennessee, see Goins
v. State, 192 Tenn. 32, 237 S.W.2d 8 (1958), not in New York, People v.
Schacher, 181 Misc. 769, 46 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1944). See also Comment, 10 VAND.
L. Rav. 608 (1957).
14. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) ; State v. Rainey, 184
La. 547, 166 So. 670 (1936).
15. See United States v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349 (D. Mont. 1913) ; United States
v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
16. See United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927) ; Billings-
ley v. United States, 274 Fed. 86 (6th Cir. 1921) ; United States v. Echols, 253
Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918) ; Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir.
1915); Peters v. Brown, 55 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1.951).
17. See Voves v. United States, 249 Fed. 191 (7th Cir. 1918). This theory
was not used again because the court realized that a person committing a crim-
inal act did intend to act, and to maintain that he did not was pure fiction.
18. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) ; Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
19. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965) ; Raley v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 423 (1959) ; Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957).
20. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958).
21. See Comment, 49 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 447 (1959).
22. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The Supreme Court felt that to apply the estoppel
'basis would be to encroach on the pardon powers of the executive and substitute
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statutory interpretation or public policy. The majority favored
legislative intent, reasoning that the legislature intended that a
criminal statute should apply only to offenders acting on their
own volition.23 This analysis was followed in Sherman v. United
States,24 although the Court was again divided on the basis for
the defense. The weakness of this approach is that Congress
might enact a statute abolishing entrapment as a defense, and
thus bring an abrupt end to the doctrine.
The concurring Justices in Sorrells2 5 and Sherman26 felt that
public policy demanded that courts refuse to allow the law en-
forcement officer to create criminals out of otherwise law-abid-
ing citizens. Public policy does not provide a consistent or pre-
dictable basis for dealing with entrapment, since courts often
differ as to what public policy demands, and in various situations
there may be only a hazy distinction between proper investiga-
tion, which the public encourages, and violations of accepted po-
lice practices. 27 The public policy basis has received support in
some state decisions, 28 including several in Louisiana. 29
Due process was rejected as a basis for the defense in United
States ex rel. Hall v. Illinois,3s where the court reasoned that
entrapment did not constitute an unlawful seizure, more prop-
erly termed an unlawful arrest, within the fourth amendment.
Consequently, the court found no analogy between entrapment
and exclusionary rules concerning prohibited search and seizure.
Other decisions, however, have based the defense of entrapment
on the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.3 ' Courts have often spoken of entrapment as intolerable
the courts as administrative controllers of the law enforcement activities of the
executive branch. See Note, 65 W. VA. L. REV. 223 (1963).
23. 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932) : "[I]t was not the intent of Congress
that its . . . enforcement should be abused by the instigation of government offi-
cials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them
into its [criminal act] commission." See also Comment, 49 J. Caim. L., C. & P.S.
447, 448 (1959).
24. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
25. Justices Roberts, Brandeis, and Stone.
26. Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, Douglas, and Brennan.
27. See Comment, 49 J. CRrm. L., C. & P.S. 447, 488 (1959).
28. See Comment, 10 VAND. L. REv. 608 (1957).
29. See State v. Turner, 241 La. 94, 127 So. 2d 512 (1961) ; State v. Rainey,
184 La. 547, .66 So. 670 (1936); State v. Abraham, 158 La. 1021, 105 So. 50
(1925).
30. 329 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1964).
31. See Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921). See also Com-
ment, 49 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 447 (1959) ; note 19 8upra.
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and unconscionable, implying that it is against the fundamental
concept of fairness which lies at the heart of due process.8 2 The
United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction in the case
of Cox v. Louisiana,3 3 in part on the basis of entrapment, stating
that "to sustain appellant's later conviction ... would be to sanc-
tion an indefensible sort of entrapment .... [T]he Due Process
Clause does not permit convictions obtained under such cir-
cumstances. '8 4 (Emphasis added.) It is not to be doubted that,
in theory, the due process clause is a proper foundation for en-
trapment; however, it would be preferable if there were a more
definite statement from the Court. A persuasive argument for
basing entrapment on the due process clause is the analogy to
coerced confessions because both induce a person to supply evi-
dence of his own guilt.35 The due process approach would raise
important procedural considerations. If due process were the
basis for the defense, entrapment might be a question of law for
the court, rather than a question of fact for the jury. 6 The
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code provides in section
2.1317T that the issue is one for the court's determination. Fur-
ther, if the defense is based on due process this would compel a
uniform application of the doctrine by the states.
32. See Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 467 (1958) : Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
33. The writer of Note, 40 TUL. L. REV. 185 (1966) -takes the position that
the case was decided on the wrong basis, and that due process should not have
been a consideration. This Comment takes an opposite position; however, it
would have been preferable had the Court made its decision more definite.
34. Id. at 571. See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
35. See Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957). See also HALL
& KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1965); Note, 1964 U. ILL. L.F.
821, 824.
36. Under the present decisions the question of whether entrapment has been
established is a 'jury question. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
37. IODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) states: "(1)
A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such
an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of
the conunission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage
in conduct constituting such offense by either: (a) making knowingly false
representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited;
or (b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substan-
tial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those
who are ready to commit it. (2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this
Section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves that
his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. (The issue of entrapmentv
shall be tried by the court in the absence of the jury.) (3) The defense afforded
by this Section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an
element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing
or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the
entrapment."
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Theory apart, the defense itself is still nebulous, 88 and it is
not simple to determine whether in a particular case the officer
is to be commended for protecting society or to be censured for
entrapping an individual.89 The line can best be determined by
examining such standards as have been established.
WHAT CONSTITUTES ENTRAPMENT
Activities that constitute entrapment differ with the circum-
stances of each case.40 The jurisprudence has indicated that since
the purpose of the defense is to prevent governmental creation
of criminals, a line must be drawn between the trap for the un-
wary innocent and the trap for the unwary predisposed crim-
inal. 41 In order to draw the line, the United States Supreme
Court, in Sorrells v. United States,42 established two related
rguideposts: (1) whether the alleged entrapper 43 has placed the
intent to commit the crime in the mind of the offender or has
merely offered him an opportunity, and (2) whether from his
Lprior actions the offender was predisposed to commit the crime.
In some cases courts emphasize the former test; and in others
38. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933).
39. See Note, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 88 (1959). One court has gone so far as to
punish the officer involved. See Rex v. Commissioner of Metropolitan Police,
reported in HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW 81 (1952), where the court said: "It is
urged . . . that these officers have broken the law for the law's good, but this
is as much as to say that the police may break a man's head if he complains
of a headache .... [I]t cannot be too clearly understood that the police are
not entitled to break the law." It does not seem likely as a practical matter,
however, that the district attorney will prosecute a policeman for the crime which
he has enticed another to commit, and this is the apparent reason for the absence
of cases on this point.
40. See Comment, 26 TENN. L. REV. 554 (1959).
41. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
42. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See also Comment, 16 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 72
(1959).
43. The question of who may entrap has rarely been a vital issue before
the court because in the usual case the person involved is an officer or a person
acting under an officer's control. See Louisiana v. Jordan, 379 U.S. 945 (1964)
(deputy called woman to make an engagement in order to arrest her for prosti-
tution); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (decoy employed by
federal agents to obtain heroin from known addict); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932) (federal agent appealed to a friend to sell him liquor);
United States v. Masciale, 236 F.2d 601 (1956) (government agents hired a man
to introduce them to accused) ; State v. Abraham, 158 La. 1021, 105 So. 50
(1925) (deputies furnished money to convicts and sent them to purchase liquor).
See also Comment, 10 VAND. L. REV. 608 n.15 (1957) ; 55 A.L.R.2d 1322 (1957).
If the person is not acting under the color of official authority the defense is
not applicable. See Knotts v. United States, 163 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1947);
Polski v. United States, 33 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1929). See also MILLER, CRIMINAL
LAW § 60 (1934). In the latter situation, however, one of the elements of the
crime might not be present. See Brock v. State, 39 So. 580 (Ala. 1905); 18
A.L.R. 146, 148 (1922).
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both questions are considered in determining whether the de-_
fense is applicable.4 4 These guides are to be applied from the
standpoint of the offender, and not, as the concurring Justices
in Sorrells advocated, from the standpoint of the police to deter-
mine whether their actions fell below the proper use of govern--
mental power. 45
There is a distinction between inducing a person to commit
an unlawful act for the purpose of prosecuting him, and setting
a trap to catch a person in the execution of a crime of his own
conception.46 In the final analysis the question is whether the
intent to commit the crime was furnished by the officer, or
whether the officer simply accommodated the accused.47 In Lou-
isiana v. Turner,48 a correctional officer at the penitentiary
learned of a plan to smuggle contraband to the inmates and pre-
tended to cooperate. The Supreme Court of Louisiana refused
to sustain a defense of entrapment and recognized the well-
settled rule that a defendant cannot rely on the fact that an
opportunity was intentionally given him to commit a crime which
had originated in his own mind.49 The Supreme Courts of the
United States and of Louisiana have also held that it is legiti-
mate to adopt devices and traps to detect crimes, provided it is
not a temptation to ensnare an otherwise law-abiding citizen
without prior criminal intent5° into committing an offense. If
the police learn that an offense is to be committed at a certain
place, they may wait until the act has been committed before
making an arrest.51 The use of decoys does not necessarily indi-
44. See Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1333 (1960). Although Sorrells was a federal
decision, state courts have adopted these tests and apply them in most cases.
See State v. Abraham, 158 La. 1021, 105 So. 50 (1925).
45. Justices Roberts, Brandeis, and Stone. This is also the position that
Justice Frankfurter advocated in his concurring opinion in Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). See also Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1333 (1960).
46. See State v. Turner, 214 La. 94, 127 So. 2d 512 (1961) ; State v. Abraham,
158 La. 1021, 105 So. 50 (1925).
47. See Williams, Entrapment: A Legal Limitation on Police Techniques,
48 J. CRIf. L., C. & P.S. 343, 345 (1957).
48. 214 La. 94, 127 So. 2d 512 (1961).
49. See, e.g., Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Knotts
v. United States, 163 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1947); United States v. Washington,
20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927).
50. Justice Roberts, concurring in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435;
453 (1932), said: "Society is at war with criminal classes, and courts have
uniformly held that in waging this warfare the forces of prevention may use
traps, decoys, and deception to obtain evidence of the commission of crime."
See State v. Rainey, 184 La. 547, 166 So. 670 (1936) ; State v. Doudoussat, 47
La. Ann. 977, 17 So. 685 (1895).
51. See Dalton v. State, 113 Ga. 1037, 39 S.E. 468 (1901) ; State v. Currie,
13 N.D. 655, 102 N.W. 875 (1905).
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cate that the officers induced an accused to do what he would not
have done in the absence of such action.52 There is conflict of
authority on the propriety of hiring informers to give an ac-
cused an opportunity to commit a crime. In Williamson v. United
States53 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that with-
out some justification a conviction cannot be sustained when an
informer is paid on a contingent basis to produce evidence
against an individual; but the court did not indicate what justi-
fication was sufficient. However, it is well settled that inform-
ers may be hired for a set amount.54 The courts seem to feel
that an informer will not manufacture evidence when a definite
sum is paid.
Generally officers may use deception to obtain evidence to
support a conviction ;55 however, decisions indicate that if the
deception is grossly unfair the defense of entrapment will be
recognized.56 The most frequent application of the defense is
in cases like Sherman v. United States,57 characterized by re-
peated requests by the entrapping officer. Courts seem to feel
that a person's resistance can be greatly reduced by persistent
urging to commit an offense. Appeals to sympathy, as for loss
of one's job if drugs could not be procured58 or for narcotics to
ease the suffering of an employer's son, 59 appeals to friendship,
by discussing war experiences, 60 and appeals to compassion"'
have also supported the defense.
52. See United States v. Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214 (D. Conn. 1923). But see
United States v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349 (D. Mont. 1913).
53. 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962) ; accord, Hill v. United States, 328 F.2d
988 (5th Cir. 1964).
54. See Reyff v. United States, 2 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1924) ; State v. Calanti,
142 Me. 50, 46 A.2d 412 (1946). See also Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 1322 (1957).
55. In United States v. Amo, 261 Fed. 106 (D. Wis. 1919), Indians were
hired to purchase liquor in contravention of a federal statute and the court said
that deception of this sort is not unreasonable. See United States v. Becker,
62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933), where postal inspectors prepared supposititious
customer orders in order to obtain evidence of mailing obscene matter.
56. In contrast to the cases in note 55 supra, a federal court in United States
v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349 (1). Mont. 1913), held that sending two Indians, who
looked like Caucasians, to purchase liquor was an unreasonable deception. In
the final analysis, the question is one of degree only. See note 80 infra.
57. 365 U.S. 369 (1958) ; see Cermak v. United States, 4 F.2d 99 (6th Cir.
1925). An example of this attitude is the court's statement in Woo Wai v.
United States, 223 Fed. 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1915) : " The scheme . . . [was]
assiduously and persistently urged upon him." Therefore, the number of requests
seems to be a significant factor in the courts' consideration.
58. See Cline v. United Stntes, 20 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1927).
59. See People v. Toler, 26 I1. 2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 874 (1962). See Annot.,
33 A.L.R.2d 884 (1952).
60. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); United States v.
Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927).
61. See United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927).
19661 COMMENTS
The second consideration used in entrapment cases is wheth-
er, from prior actions, it appears the accused was predisposed to
commit the offense.02  The predisposition of the accused is of
paramount importance in determining whether there was an
inducement to commit the crime or whether the officer merely
furnished an opportunity to the accused.6 The courts have uni-
formly held that the degree of inducement can be greater when
it appears that the accused has previously engaged in criminal
activity.64 Thus, once the defense of entrapment has been raised,
it is proper to inquire into the reputation of the accused to deter-
mine his predisposition to commit the offense so as to adjudge
the reasonableness of the officer's conduct.6 5 Evidence of the
officer's knowledge of the reputation of the accused and his prior
conduct is considered relevant." This evidence is not considered
by the court as an attack upon character, but is specifically
admitted on the question of entrapment, and its relevance is
confined to whether the officer's conduct was an inducement or
merely an opportunity for one already predisposed. 7 The admis-
sion of this evidence has been held improper where (1) it is
extremely prejudicial and the defendant with a prior criminal
record is faced with a substantial sentence, 6 and (2) the issue
should be the standard of the officer's conduct and not the dis-
position of the accused. 9
62. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
63. See State v. Turner & Sheeler, 241 La. 94, 127 So. 2d 512 (1961).
64. See Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1954); Henry v.
United States, 215 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1954). Illustrative of this is Judge Hand's
statement in United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1932), that
the agent's conduct is excused when there has been an "existing course of similar
conduct . . . [or the accused] already formed design to commit the crime or
similar crimes."
65. See Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687 (1960).
66. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932); Billingsley v.
United States, 274 Fed. 86 (6th Cir. 1421); State v. Turner & Wheeler, 241
La. 94, 127 So. 2d 512 (1961); 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 45(2); Comment,
49 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 447, 450 (1959).
67. See State v. Turner & Wheeler, 241 La. 94, 127 So. 2d 512 (1961);
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 158 (1954). This view is criticized in Comment, 49
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 447, 450 (1959).
68. In United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160, 162 (D. Neb. 1927), the
court recognized this possibility and said: "A hated and suspected man must
stand before the court like any other . . . . [N]either suspicion nor honest belief
that the defendant committed other offenses at other times has any place in the
inquiry." The writer of Comment, 49 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 447 (1959) recog-
nizes that this type of evidence might also be beneficial to the defendant if his
past is void of prior criminal activity. The court in Butts v. United States, 273
Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921) recognized this and sustained a defense of entrapment
because of the lack of prior criminal conduct.
69. 297 U.S. 435, 459 (1932). See note 44 supra.
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Basically, entrapment is a relationship between the offend-
ler's disposition and the officer's inducement sufficient to allow
the jury or the court to find that the act is that of the officer.
THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT APPLIED TO
PARTICULAR OFFENSES
There seems to be a marked difference in the application of
entrapment to regulatory statutes, such as narcotics and liquor
laws, and to the traditional common-law crimes, such as robbery
and murder. Regulatory statutes are designed to condemn be-
havior of the individual directed, not against other individuals,
but against public order. The violation of a regulatory statute is
frequently part of a pattern of anti-social behavior, and it is
often necessary for law enforcement officers to rely on their own
diligence to bring the offender to justice. In traditional com-
mon-law crimes, extrinsic evidence is often readily available as
to the commission of the offense. Also, the seriousness of the
crime militates against allowing an offender to escape punish-
ment because of police tactics; consequently, the defense is lim-
ited to regulatory defenses and is not available in the traditional
common-law crimes. 70
The bulk of the cases in which entrapment has been urged
involve liquor violations and narcotics offenses. 71 In order to
prevent entrapment, officers who buy illegal liquor must have
a reasonable suspicion that the accused is engaged in, or is about
:, .to engage in, illegal sales, and the initiative must have originated
with the accused.7 2 This reasonable suspicion does not require
probable cause ;73 and accordingly, the previous record of the
accused and his probable predisposition, are only factors tend-
ing to support or negate the defense. In Louisiana v. Abra-
ham,7 " deputies released convicts to purchase "pear extract"
70. See Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA.
L. REV. 871, 874 (1963) ; Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons, and Agents I'rovocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951).
71. In a 1927 case, Washington v. United States, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb.
1927), the court estimated that 30,000 of 44,000 liquor prosecutions involved
sales to government agents. However, it must be remembered that these statistic;
were compiled during prohibition. Today narcotic violations furnish the most
frequent application of the defense. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958); United States v. Marciale, 236 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1956).
72. See United States %. Certain Quantities of Intoxicating Liquor, 290 Fed:
824 (D. N.l. 1923).
73. See Comments, 26 LA. L. REV. 802 (1966).
74. 158 La. 1021, 105 So. 50 (1925).
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which they believed contained a prohibited amount of alcohol.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the well-settled rule
that it is not a defense that the purchase was made by a detec-
tive or a person acting under his direction, if there are reason-
able grounds to believe the accused was already engaged in
illegally selling liquor. 5 The pivotal question is whether the
accused is ready and waiting for an opportunity to make a
sale.7 6  A question of possible deception of an innocent seller
is presented when an agent procures a minor to purchase liquor.
In these cases the courts stress the appearance of the minor and
whether the accused was willing to sell to a minor.7 7
The general rules of entrapment apply to prosecutions for
the unlawful sale 7  or possession of narcotics 7 9 and because of
the nature and seriousness of the offense, police are forced to
use unconventional means of apprehension. As a result, entrap-
ment is often sustained in narcotics cases. The use of decep-
tion, such as having an officer pose as an addict,80 or traps,
such as giving the offender an opportunity to sell,8' does not
75. See Radon v. United States, 269 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1959) (seaman hired
by agents to sell obviously contraband liquor to tavern owner) ; United States v.
Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927) (agent purchased illegal liquor);
United States v. Amo, 261 Fed. 106 (D. Wis. 1919) (full-blooded Indians em-
ployed to purchase liquor). But see Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932) (prohibition agent induced accused to purchase liquor -by appealing to
friendship) ; Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962) (govern-
ment agents hired informer on contingent basis to persuade accused to sell liquor
in an illegal manner) ; Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956)
(state officers induced accused to operate an illegal still in order to prosecute
in federal court).
76. See 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 45(2).
77. The reason for the uncertainty seems to stem from the possible applica-
tions of federal cases by analogy. In United States v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349 (D.
Mont. 1913), an Indian, who looked Caucasian, was hired to purchase liquor by
government agents. The defense of entrapment was sustained on the grounds
that such deception was an abuse of government power. In United States v. Amo,
261 Fed. 106 (D. Wis. 1919), two full-blooded Indians were hired to purchase
liquor and the defense was rejected on the grounds that from the circumstances
thv accused must have known he was selling liquor to an Indian. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana rejected the defense in State v. Emerson, 233 La. 885, 98
So. 2d 225 (1957), when minors hired -by state agents purchased beer. In Emerson
the minors obviously gave the appearance of 'being under the required age and
were served upon request. A similar Montana case, State v. Parr, 129 Mont.
175, 283 P.2d 1086 (1955), refused to sustain the defense because the minor
who was sent to purchase the liquor clearly appeared to be over twenty-one. An
additional factor brought out in the Parr case is that it was against public policy
to have wards of the state purchase liquor. This point has never arisen in
Louisiana; however, it seems there could be a strong argument formed on this
point.
78. See Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1958).
79. See State v. Rainey, 184 La. 547, 166 So. 670 (1936).
80. See Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958).
81. See People v. Toler, 26 Ill. 2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 874 (1962).
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constitute entrapment where there is reasonable suspicion that
the law is being violated by the defendant. 82 If an officer uses
no more persuasion than is necessary to effect an ordinary sale
and the accused is willing to make the sale, there is no entrap-
ment.8 3 If, however, the officer makes repeated requests or ap-
peals to the accused, and the latter is an otherwise law-abiding
citizen, the courts will not allow the law-enforcement officer to
create a criminal. 84
The defense of entrapment is also available in prostitution
cases; however, Louisiana v. Jordan5 applied the well-estab-
lished rule that if the officer merely asks a known prostitute
for a "date" the defense is not available. The tests formulated
in Sorrells v. United States"6 as to origin of the intent and the
prior record of the accused, have been adopted in the Model
Penal Code,87 and have been applied in cases involving gam-
bling,""8 transportation of aliens,89 medical licensing,90 and mail-
ing obscene matter.9 1 It seems that the defense would also apply
to numerous other regulatory offenses.
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement officers should be allowed ample latitude
in methods of investigation, but the protection of the individual
citizen should remain the primary consideration. The defense
of entrapment, which excuses one who is lured, enticed, or
82. See 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 45(4).
83. See United States v. Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214 (D. Conn. 1923) (officers
hired a beggar to purchase narcotics and le did without urging defendant to
sell).
84. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (agent induced
accused, a drug addict, to purchase heroin) ; United States v. Marciale, 236 F.2d
601 (2d Cir. 1956) (agent persisted for seven months) ; Butts v. United States,
273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921) (agent told accused that if he purchased he would
be given immunity).
85. 379 U.S. 945 (1964). See also Bolick v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. App.
534, 309 SA. 74 (1958) (officer expressed interest in a particular girl, where-
upon accused procured her); State v. Poague, 245 Minn. 438, 72 N.W.2d 620
(1955) (officer procured girl through "escort" bureau).
86. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
87. See note 37 supra.
88. See State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A.2d 219 (1952) (officer gave
bellboy money to bet on horse); Commonwealth v. Conway, 173 A.2d 777 (Pa.
1961) (cab driver let agent place bets with him). See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d
1206 (1953).
89. Soo Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
90. See Aitchison v. United States, 98 A.2d 791 (D.C. Munie. Ct. 1953)
Peters v. Brown, 55 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1951).
91. See United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1.007 (2d Cir. 1933).
COMMENTS
tricked into committing a crime he would not otherwise have
committed, safeguards the weak. The courts have recognized
that the primary function of the law enforcement officer is to
prevent crimes, not to instigate them, though it may sometimes
be difficult to distinguish between investigation and instigation.
A definite foundation for the defense is needed, and if it were
placed under the due process clauses of the fifth and the four-
teenth amendments, it could be uniformly applied in both fed-
eral and state courts. A more satisfactory test for entrapment
is desirable, but the formulation of such a test is difficult and
the Model Penal Code92 does no more than codify the tests given
in the Sorrells decision. Possibly it is best to recognize that en-
trapment is a defense based on a combination of circumstances,
such as the origin of the intent and the evidence of predisposi-
tion of the accused.
Charles S. McCowan, Jr.
92. See note 37 supra.
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